During a phone conversation on August 5, 2000, two traders chatted about how a wildfire  in  California  would  allow  Enron  to  jack  up  its  electricity  prices.  “The magical word of the day,” one trader said, “is ‘Burn, Baby, Burn.’” A few months later, a pair of Enron traders named Kevin and Tom talked about how California officials wanted to make Enron refund the profits of its price gouging.  

• KEVIN  :  They’re fucking taking all the money back from you guys? All the money you guys stole from those poor grandmas in California?
• BOB : Yeah, Grandma Millie, man. 
• KEVIN  :  Yeah,  now  she  wants  her  fucking  money  back  for  all  the  power  you jammed right up her ass for fucking $250 a megawatt hour.  

If you were to assume that many experts use their information to your detriment, you’d be right. Experts depend on the fact that you don’t have the information they do. Or that you are so befuddled by the complexity of their operation that you wouldn’t know what to do with the information if you had it. Or that you are so in awe of their expertise that you wouldn’t dare challenge them. If your doctor suggests that you have angioplasty—even though some current research suggests that angioplasty often does little to prevent heart attacks—you aren’t likely to think that the doctor is using his informational advantage to make a few
thousand dollars for himself or his buddy. But as David Hillis, an interventional cardiologist at the University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center in Dallas, explained to the New York Times, a doctor may have the same economic incentives as a car salesman or a funeral director or a mutual fund manager: “If you’re an invasive cardiologist and Joe Smith, the local internist, is sending you patients, and if you tell them they don’t need the procedure,  pretty soon Joe Smith doesn’t send patients anymore.”  

Armed with information, experts can exert a gigantic, if unspoken, leverage: fear. Fear that your children will find you dead on the bathroom floor of a heart attack if you do not have angioplasty surgery. Fear that a cheap casket will expose your grandmother to a terrible underground fate. Fear that a $25,000 car will crumple like a toy in an accident, whereas a $50,000 car will wrap your loved ones in a cocoon of impregnable steel. The fear created by commercial  experts  may  not quite rival the fear created by terrorists like the Ku Klux Klan, but the principle is the same.  

Consider a transaction that wouldn’t seem, on the surface, to create much fear: selling your house. What’s so scary about that? Aside from the fact that selling a house is typically the  largest financial transaction in your life, and that you probably have scant experience in real  estate, and that you may have an enormous emotional attachment to your house, there  are at least two pressing fears: that you will sell the house for far less than it is worth and that you will not be able to sell it at all.  

In the first case, you fear setting the price too low; in the second, you fear setting it  too  high.  It  is  the  job  of  your  real-estate  agent,  of  course,  to  find  the  golden mean. She is the one with all the information: the inventory of similar houses, the recent sales trends, the tremors of the mortgage market, perhaps even a lead on an interested buyer. You feel fortunate to have such a knowledgeable expert as an ally in this most confounding enterprise.  

Too bad she sees things differently. A real-estate agent may see you not so much as an ally but as a mark. Think back to the study cited at the beginning of this book, which measured the difference between the sale prices of homes that belonged  to  real-estate  agents  themselves and the houses they sold for their clients. The study found that an agent keeps her own house on the market an average ten extra days, waiting for a better offer, and sells it for over 3 percent more than your house—or $10,000 on the sale of a $300,000 house. That’s $10,000 going into her pocket that does not go into yours, a nifty profit produced by the abuse of information and a keen understanding of incentives. The problem is that the agent only stands to personally gain an additional $150 by selling your
house for $10,000 more, which isn’t much reward for a lot of extra work. So her job is to  convince you that a $300,000 offer is in fact a very good offer, even a generous one, and that only a fool would refuse it.  

This can be tricky. The agent does not want to come right out and call you a fool. So she merely implies it—perhaps by telling you about the much bigger, nicer, newer house down the block that has sat unsold for six months. Here is the agent’s main weapon: the conversion of information into fear. Consider this true story, related by John Donohue, a  law professor  who in 2001 was teaching at Stanford University: “I was just about to buy a house on the Stanford campus,” he recalls, “and the seller’s agent kept telling me what a good deal I was getting because the market was about to zoom. As soon as I signed the purchase contract,
he asked me if I would need an agent to sell my previous Stanford house. I told him that I would probably try to sell without an agent, and he replied, ‘John, that might  work  under  normal  conditions,  but  with  the  market  tanking  now,  you really need the help of a broker.’”  

Within five minutes, a zooming market had tanked. Such are the marvels that can be conjured by an agent in search of the next deal.  

Consider now another true story of a real-estate agent’s information abuse. The tale involves K., a close friend of one of this book’s authors. K. wanted to buy a house that was listed at $469,000. He was prepared to offer $450,000 but he first called the seller’s agent and asked her to name the lowest price that she thought the homeowner might accept. The agent promptly scolded K. “You ought to be ashamed of yourself,” she said. “That is clearly a violation of real-estate ethics.”   K. apologized. The conversation turned to other, more mundane issues. After ten minutes, as the conversation was ending, the agent told K., “Let me say one last thing. My client is willing to sell this house for a lot less than you might think.”   Based on this conversation, K. then offered $425,000 for the house instead of the $450,000 he had planned to offer. In the end, the seller accepted $430,000. Thanks to  his  own  agent’s    intervention,  the  seller  lost  at  least  $20,000.  The  agent, meanwhile, only lost $300—a small price to pay to ensure that she would quickly and easily lock up the sale, which netted her a commission of $6,450.

So a big part of a real-estate agent’s job, it would seem, is to persuade the homeowner  to  sell for less than he would like while at the same time  letting potential buyers know that a house can be bought for less than its listing price. To be sure, there are more subtle means of doing so than coming right out and telling the buyer to bid low. The study of real-estate agents cited above also includes data that reveals how agents convey information  through the for-sale ads they write. A phrase like “well  maintained,” for instance, is as full of
meaning to an agent as “Mr. Ayak” was to a Klansman; it means that a house is old  but  not  quite falling down.  A savvy buyer will know this (or find out for himself once he sees the  house), but to the sixty-five-year-old retiree who is selling his house, “well  maintained”  might sound like a compliment, which is just what the agent intends.  

(…)

It would be naïve to suppose that people abuse information only when they are acting as  experts or agents of commerce.  Agents and experts are people too—which suggests that we are likely to abuse information in our personal lives as well, whether by withholding true information or editing the information we choose to put forth. A real-estate agent may  wink and nod when she lists a “well-maintained” house, but we each have our equivalent hedges.